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Abstract: 
This paper develops a series of Early Warning System models for debt crises. This paper uses a 
Debt Pressure index to define crisis periods and then demonstrates how one can go about trying 
to forecast these periods using Logit and Markov-switching Models. An alternative approach, 
whereby ordinary least squares (OLS) is used to create Early Warning System models, is 
introduced. A graphical analysis is also conducted. Three useful Early Warning System models 
emerge from this study.  
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1. Introduction 
Although economists had long been studying crises with the advantage of hindsight, it was after 
the Tequila Crisis in 1994-5 that economists focused their attention towards crisis prediction. 
Such a topic gained even more popularity after the Asian crisis in the late 1990s. However, these 
crises drew attention to creating Early Warning System (EWS) models that could forecast 
currency crises (Berg, Borenztein and Patillo, 2004). 
In light of the recent global financial crisis (the 2007 subprime collapse) it is clear that debt 
crises are costly and should be avoided. With particular focus on debt crises in South Africa, this 
paper will explore the methodology behind creating a functional EWS model. This paper will 
also create models that forecast debt crises in order to outline the approaches that can be taken to 
create such EWS models.  
A debt crisis is not a new phenomenon. In fact, such crises go back as early as 4
th
 century BC 
when 10 of the 13 Greek Municipalities defaulted on loan credit received from the Delos Temple 
(Winkler, 1933). Debt restructurings became practice following the defaults in France, Portugal 
and Spain in the 16
th
 century (Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano, 2003). It was in the 19
th
 century 
that defaults and debt rescheduling agreements became even more common- this was mainly due 
to developments in the financial system, governments gaining independence and rising foreign 
loans (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006).   
In the literature, the most common method of forecasting is to use the Logit model approach, 
although other methods such as Markov-switching have been suggested as being possibly more 
robust alternatives (Fedderke, 2011). Both of these approaches will be used. Additional 
approaches used in this study are: a graphical analysis as well as an Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) approach. 
In order to motivate the importance of predicting and thus avoiding economic crises, I will 
briefly mention some of the effects of an economic crisis. Reinhart and Reinhart (2010), while 
assessing the affect of 18 crises on a country’s economic proficiency, find: 
 A decade after a financial crises or world-wide shock real GDP per capita growth rates 
remain significantly lower than their pre crisis levels. Generally, 1 percent lower.  
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 Unemployment rates increase post crisis by generally 5%. The authors also point out that 
out of 15 crises considered, 10 resulted in the unemployment rate not returning to 
previous levels.  
 Following a crisis, the real housing prices decrease and remain low for up to ten years 
after the crisis.  
 Deleveraging post crisis can take up to seven years. 
 There are reductions in inflation post crisis. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) point out that, after a crisis, public debt may also rise. The authors 
suggest that in the post war period public debt may have increased by up to 86%.  
Therefore, early warning systems are needed to attain ―early signals that the pressure for a crisis 
may be building, allowing policy makers to undertake preventive measures in order to pre-empt 
the occurrence of crises.‖ (Fedderke, 2011, pg 11)  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the different types of financial 
crises; Section 3 looks at the underlying propagation mechanisms of a crisis. Section 4 reviews 
the empirical literature; Section 5 looks at the methodology behind creating Early Warning 
Systems and tabulates the data used in this study. Section 6 describes four different Early 
Warning System models; Section 7 conducts a graphical analysis and Section 8 concludes with 
recommendations for future research.   
2. Types of Financial Crises 
Early Warning System models have been created to attempt to forecast the onset of a crisis. In 
particular, there are six types of crises that one can attempt to forecast. Generally, the term 
financial crises refers to the three types of crises that are more common in the literature- currency 
crises, banking crises and debt crises; with currency crises being the most popular in the 
literature. A brief description of these crises is given below: 
1. Currency Crisis- Such crises care broadly defined as currency devaluations or 
depreciations. This type of crisis is more visible than other types of crises. It also occurs 
more frequently and is thus the most studied type of crisis in the EWS literature. 
Currency depreciations lead to inflationary pressures and hence interest rate charges. 
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This leads to a lower growth and a higher rate of unemployment. Strong appreciations 
have a negative impact on exports and hence GDP. 
2. Banking Crisis- A banking crisis refers to the situation when banks are unable to act as 
intermediaries. Banking crises can result in lower growth and a higher rate of 
unemployment due to a drop in investment, consumption and credit, brought about by 
the rising uncertainty in the market. A bank’s inability to generate credit, and thus 
finance investment, will also have a negative effect on growth levels. Studies on banking 
crises include: Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) 
and Lestano, Jacobs and Kuper (2003). 
3. Debt Crisis- A debt crisis is generally defined as a situation where default on government 
debt occurs either under another countries jurisdiction (external debt crisis) or under the 
domestic countries jurisdiction (domestic debt crisis). Such crises result in lower growth, 
higher unemployment and spikes in the interest rate due to the defaulter’s higher risk 
rating (Fedderke, 2011).  
Other types of crises are: Asset Bubbles (these crises are associated with banking crises), 
Macroeconomic Crises (generally related to price stability or inflation) and Fiscal Crises (related 
to the sustainability of public finances).
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3. The Underlying Propagation Mechanisms of a Crisis 
The theory-based literature on early warning systems is split into three groups based on the 
primary cause of the crisis. 
The first generation models suggest that it is flaws in the domestic economy fundamentals drive 
instability. In this case focus is on the economic indicators that may suggest such economic 
disparities. The seminal contribution to first generation models was the speculative attack model 
by Krugman (1979).  This model assumes that budget deficits are financed through monetization. 
Monetary authorities reduce their levels of foreign reserves in order to keep the exchange rate 
fixed. Such an approach is unsustainable as the central bank does not have an infinite supply or 
foreign reserves. Speculators know that this approach of fixing the exchange rate is unsustainable 
and this results in a speculative attack that takes place when the fixed exchange rate equals the 
                                                          
1
 The interested reader is referred to Fedderke (2011) for information on such crises. 
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shadow exchange rate.
2
 Thus, reductions in reserves, increases in budget (or current account) 
deficits, growth in domestic credit or an overvalued exchange rate are early warning signals of a 
potential crisis or speculative attack.  
The second generation view on financial crises is that a crisis can occur due to the role of 
expectations of economic agents. This allows for multiple equilibria to emerge. In the extreme 
case where agents have perfect information, expectations become self-fulfilling, making crisis 
prediction unfeasible.  
The third generation approach to financial crises is concerned with contagion. Contagion refers 
to a situation where a crisis in one country increases the likelihood of a crisis occurring in 
another country. Although the studies of contagion do not use an identical definition of 
contagion, it can be generally defined as the spread of crises from one country to another. In the 
context of Early Warning Systems, it is necessary to distinguish between two types of contagion- 
pure contagion and shift contagion. 
Shift contagion refers to a situation where a crisis is propagated through linkages between 
markets. Pure contagion, on the other hand, refers to crisis propagation between markets when 
there are no direct links between those markets. That is, under pure contagion, a crisis can spread 
between markets that are not economically linked, due to the perception and behavior of 
investors (Fedderke, 2011). Put differently, pure contagion results from the spill-over of 
idiosyncratic shocks rather than shocks to common fundamentals.  
It is important for policy makers to know what the underlying propagation mechanism is as each 
distinction carries different policy implications.
3
 For example, a shock that affects common 
fundamentals between markets will require temporary stabilization as well as intervention aimed 
at the domestic markets’ structural features. Idiosyncratic shocks that have spilled over into other 
markets will also require temporary stabilization as well as talks with the authorities of the 
country hit by the shock, in order to improve regulation and reduce the chance that such a shock 
will reoccur (Fedderke and Marinkov, 2011).  
Macroeconomic warning systems are concerned with domestic economic indicators and thus fit 
in with the first generation approach (Fedderke, 2011).  
                                                          
2
 Note: The shadow exchange rate is that would occur under a floating exchange rate system. 
3
 See Fedderke and Marinkov (2011) on how to identify the underlying cause of a crisis.  
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4.  Empirical Literature Review 
Four crises in the early to mid 1990’s drew the attention of economists to the need to create an 
early warning system to signal the probable development of crises. They were the European 
Monetary System (ERS) crisis of 1992, the collapse of the Mexican Peso known as the Tequila 
crisis of 1994, the Asian flu of 1997 and the Russian virus of 1998 (Lestano, Jacobs and Kuper, 
2003). 
Much of the literature on Early Warning Systems is focused on currency crises; and the seminal 
works will be discussed here. Debt crises have received less attention in the literature and the 
relevant debt related papers will also be discussed in this section.  
An early warning system is a system that has two components: ―a precise definition of a crisis 
and a mechanism for generating predictions of crises‖ (Edison, 2000, pp3).  
4.1 A precise definition of a crisis  
4.1.1 A currency crisis definition 
The literature contains a variety of definitions of crisis episodes. Eichengreen et al (1995) defines 
a currency crisis as either a successful speculative attack which results in significant movements 
in exchange rates or an unsuccessful speculative attack- an attack warded off by policy-makers.
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Krugman (1979) defined currency crises as speculative attacks; the study assumed that the 
exchange rate remained fixed until a crisis ensued.
5
 Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997) 
used the same crisis definition as Eichengreen et al (1995) but with one alteration- they did not 
include interest rate differentials.  
4.1.2 A Debt Crisis Definition 
 The literature on debt crises commonly uses the concept of debt rescheduling as a definition for 
a debt crisis. Debt rescheduling refers to a situation where debtors negotiate a revised contract 
with their creditors. Such a revised contract may entail a reduction on the repayment and service 
of the debt as well as an extended period over which payment is made (Lestano, Jacobs and 
                                                          
4
 Unsuccessful speculative attacks are not easily observable, thus Eichengreen et al (1995) use sudden decreases in 
reserves or rises in the interest rate as indicative of such unsuccessful attacks.  
5
 Connolly (1986) introduced crawling pegs to the model while Krugman and Rotemberg (1991) extended it to 
currency bands.  
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Kuper, 2003). Studies that have used this definition include Berg and Sachs (1988), Lanoie and 
Lemarbre (1996) and Marchesi (2003).  
Another definition of a debt crisis comprises of three elements: 1. Debt rescheduling 2. The 
presence of the upper-tranche IMF agreement 3. Arrears that exceed some threshold level.
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Studies that have used this definition of a debt crisis include Hajivassiliou (1989, 1994) and 
Ciarlone and Trebeschi (2006). 
4.1.3 Equations used in the literature for defining a crisis 
Earning warning mechanisms are necessary for forecasting the occurrence of a crisis. The most 
commonly used mechanisms are the Signals approach and the Logit approach. These two 
approaches require predetermined crisis periods. In this section I will briefly touch on the 
equations used by previous studies to determine currency crisis periods.  
EWS models in the literature do not all use one agreed upon definition of a crisis. Generally, a 
crisis occurs when a variables moves above some threshold. The way in which an EWS defines a 
crisis will affect the number of crises it produces (Berg, Borenztein and Patillo, 2004).  
There are a range of currency crisis pressure indicators that have been developed: 
Eichengreen et al (1994) suggests the following specification for the pressure variable: 
   (4.1.3.1) 
The nominal exchange rate of the ith country in period t is ei,t. The foreign reserves to M1 ratio is 
RMi,t while ri,t is the nominal interest rate. The reference country is the US. The standard 
deviations of the proportional changes act as weights and are given by σ. The reasoning behind 
this specification is that misaligned fundamentals may influence the maintainability of a 
currency’s exchange rate. The pressure put on the currency in such a situation is what this 
specification attempts to pick up (Fedderke, 2011).  
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997) use the following equation to measure market pressure: 
     (4.1.3.2) 
                                                          
6
 Arrears refer to amounts that are unpaid after payment was due. The IMF agreement is outlined in IMF (2001).  
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RES stands for foreign reserves. This specification is simply a variant of Eichengreen et al’s 
(1994) specification- the intuition behind it is the same as above.  
Another variant of equation 4.1.3.1 is the definition used by Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002). 
Here, the weighted average of one-period proportional changes in the constituent variables is 
used to measure pressure on the sustainability of a given exchange rate. That is, they define the 
exchange rate pressure (EMP) as follows:  
     (4.1.3.3) 
Where RER is the real exchange rate, r is the interest rate, RES represents foreign reserves and 
the ω’s are the relative weights such that more weight is given to more precise variables:  
,      (4.1.3.4) 
The intuition of this specification is the same as that of equation 4.1.3.1- briefly; this 
specification indicates the pressure on a given exchange rate of a currency due to misaligned 
factors. 
Using the exchange rate pressure variable, EMP, one can now use the following equation to 
indicate periods of crisis: 
      (4.1.3.5) 
Where the EMP pierces the set boundary, a crisis is indicated. The idea to use two standard 
deviations to create the boundary is arbitrary.  Eichengreen et al (1994) use 1.5 standard 
deviations above the mean to set the threshold. Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997) add 3 
standard deviations to the mean to set their boundary. While Fedderke (2011) and Lestano, 
Jacobs and Kuper (2003) prefer setting the threshold at 2 standard deviations above the mean.  
Frankel and Rose (1996) try a more direct specification, where the use of the underlying market 
pressure indicator (EMP) is avoided and the exchange rate is used directly to indicate a crisis:  
   (4.1.3.6) 
This specification is simpler and more explicit than that of equations 4.1.3.1 to 4.1.3.3. 
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4.2 A mechanism for generating predictions of crises 
Once the crisis periods are defined, a EWS model is needed to forecast the onset of such crises. 
The approaches used in the literature to forecast crisis episodes are discussed here.  
4.2.1 Estimating Structural/ Theory Based Models 
4.2.1.1 Estimating First Generation Models 
The studies by Blanco and Garber (1986) and Edin and Vredin (1993) are early attempts at 
creating models to explain and predict crises. Both papers focused on currency crises and set out 
to empirically estimate structural first generation models (Abiad, 1999). Using quarterly data for 
Mexico over the period 1973- 1981, Blanco and Garber (1986) looked at recurrent devaluations 
in the context of the speculative attack model. Using monthly data over the period 1979-89 for 
four Nordic countries, Edin and Vredin (1993) studied devaluations with regard to bands and 
target zones. The in-sample performance of both models was satisfactory. In fact, the Mexican 
devaluation of 1982 was forecasted by Blanco and Garber (1986). However, these models were 
limited. That is, they were only able to look at pressures brought about by monetary imbalances
7
 
- no other sources of pressure were considered. However, since other indicators may change their 
behavior in the periods surrounding crises, the literature has looked for less restrictive 
approaches whereby a multitude of indicators can be considered. Thus, the approaches for 
developing early warning systems moved away from empirical estimates of theory based models 
to approaches where one has complete freedom in choosing the indicator variables (Abiad, 
1999).   
4.2.1.2 Cross Country Regression for Looking at Contagion  
Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) looked at how the Mexican crisis in 1994 affected the other 
emerging markets the following year. The study used cross sectional data for 20 countries in 
1995. Due to the cross sectional nature of this approach, it does not provide insight regarding the 
timing of a crisis but it does indicate which countries are more likely to experience more severe 
crises when global changes occur. That is, the study aims to determine which macroeconomic 
indicators explain the vulnerability of different countries to contagion effects. Originally this 
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 For example: domestic credit growth in Blanco and Garber’s study. The indictors used in Edin and Vredin’s study 
were: money, output, the foreign interest rate, foreign price level, the real exchange rate, foreign reserves/ imports 
and the trade balance.  
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approach was aimed at explaining the Mexican crisis but has since been applied to the Asian 
crisis.
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4.2.2Event Study Analysis 
Event study analyses have been used in the literature to examine the behavior of variables before 
a crisis occurs and after the crisis has taken place. Thus, both the ―seeds‖ and the ―aftermath‖ of 
a crisis can be studied (Frankel and Rose, 1996, pp 359).  Event study analyses have been used in 
the currency crisis literature by Eichengreen et al (1995) and Frankel and Rose (1996).  In the 
debt crisis literature, it has been used by Ciarlone and Trebeschi (2006). Here, I will briefly 
outline the Event Study methodology found in Frankel and Rose (1996). 
Frankel and Rose (1996) refer to a currency crash as a situation where a substantial depreciation 
in the nominal exchange rate (at least 25% against the US dollar) is also at least 10% greater than 
any depreciation in the previous year. Annual data from 1971 to 1992 for 105 developing 
countries was used. The authors investigated numerous different indicators that may affect how 
vulnerable a country is to a crisis. When defining crisis periods, Frankel and Rose made use of 
an exclusion window; they ignored crises that took place within three years of each other so that 
no double counting took place. Observations that do not lie in the exclusion window and are non 
crisis observations are termed tranquil observations and are used as a control for comparing the 
behavior of a variable around a crisis period. Frankel and Rose (1996) illustrate the behavior of 
16 possible indicator variables, each on a separate set of axes. This shows the movements of the 
variables three years before and after a crisis. For comparative purposes, a horizontal line is 
included in each graph, representing the averages for the tranquil periods. Although these 
univariate graphs provide some insight, one cannot infer from them what the marginal input of 
each variable is. Therefore, Frankel and Rose (1996) introduce the probit approach. 
4.2.3The Logit/ Probit Approach 
In their 1996 paper, Frankel and Rose set out to define ―currency crashes‖ and then forecast them 
using both an event study analysis as well as the probit approach.
9
 They use the probit approach 
to try forecasting the probability of a crisis occurring, one year ahead. Most of the coefficients in 
their contemporaneous regression are found to not be statistically significant. In their regression 
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 See Berg  and Patillo (1999) 
9
 The methodology behind the probit approach can be found in section 5.5 of this paper. 
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where all the indicator variables were lagged by one year, the authors achieved results that 
echoed Krugman’s (1979) model of speculative attacks.  
The literature is predominantly focused on currency crises. However, following the crises in 
Turkey in 2002 and Brazil in 2001, there has been growing interest in EWSs for debt crises 
(Ciarlone and Trebeschi, 2006). Below is a brief discussion on the studies that have used the 
logit/probit approach to forecast debt crises.
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Lanoie and Lamarbre (1996) and Marchesi (2003) used probit models to create early warning 
systems for debt crises. Lanoie and Lamarbre (1996) used annual data from 1983 to 1996 for 87 
countries and found that the ratio of the current account to GDP was a significant crisis indicator 
variable. Marchesi (2003) used annual data from 1989 to 1990 for 93 countries.  
Lestano, Jacobs and Kuper (2003) create a EWS for 6 Asian countries using data from 1970 to 
2001. Logit models are created for a banking crisis, a currency crisis and a debt crisis. The 
authors use debt rescheduling as their definition of a debt crisis. They used factor analysis to 
reduce the number of potential indicators; after which, the indicators are used as the right hand 
side variables in a logit model. Broadly, they conclude that financial crisis indicators do provide 
useful information regarding the onset of a crisis. The debt crises models used in their study 
performed well for signaling crises in Indonesia. The out-of-sample models in their study 
performed poorly. 
Ciarlone and Trebeschi (2006) used a multinomial approach to develop a EWS for debt crises. 
While Bussiere and Fratzcher (2002) applied a multinomial logit to currency crises, Cialone and 
Trebeschi (2006) were the first to apply this approach to debt crises. Data was used from 1980 to 
2002 for 28 emerging market countries that had access to international capital markets. The 
authors also conducted an event study analysis to illustrate the behavior of indicator variables 
around a crisis period. Their model performed well both in- and out-of-sample.  
4.2.4 Signals Approach 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) and Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997) developed the 
signals approach. This approach looks at the behavior of indicator variables before a crisis took 
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 To see how the logit approach can be applied to any type of crisis, see Fedderke (2011). Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1996) apply the logit/ probit approach to banking crises. 
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place. In this approach the indicator variables are made into binary variables. The dependent 
variable is also binary. 
The methodology developed by these two studies is present below: 
The signals approach connects the binary crisis indicator variable (CCt) to a number of signal 
variables.
11
 Signal variables are chosen either on theoretical grounds or because they have 
experienced significant changes in their behavior before a crisis. Signal variables are denoted St 
such that St={0,1}. St takes on a value of 1 when a signal is generated. Such a signal is generated 
when the indicator (Xt) exceeds a threshold (X
*
).
12
  That is, 
        (4.2.4.1) 
The classification of signals is intuitive; a good signal is followed by a crisis within some 
predetermined period of time, a bad signal is not. The more indicators sending out signals, the 
more concerned one should be about a crisis ensuing. The threshold used in equation 4.2.4.1 is 
not arbitrary. The threshold is chosen to maximize the signal to noise ratio i.e. the ratio of good 
signals to bad signals. Such a ratio is also useful for the ranking and dropping of indicators. 
There is a tradeoff between false signals and missed crises and the threshold is chosen to balance 
this trade-off. Recall, it is in the calculation of CCt that the threshold is chosen is arbitrary.  
 Crisis No Crisis 
Signal A B – Type II error: False 
positive signal 
No signal C –Type I error: False 
negative signal  
D 
Table 4.2.4.1
13
:  Evaluating the accuracy of the Signals Approach 
Using table 1, the predictive performance of indicator variables can be assessed. Examples of 
possible assessment criteria are mentioned below: 
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 See section 4.1.3 for the equations used, in the literature, to create the CC variable.  
12
 To incorporate both positive and negative shocks, the absolute value of the signal variables is used. 
13
 Source: Fedderke (2011) 
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1. The simple accuracy criterion: This criterion seeks to maximize the ratio of correct calls 
to total calls, , or minimize the ratio of false calls to total calls, . 
2. Another criterion involves minimizing the occurrence of type II errors. Policy makers, 
with financial systems that are to some degree stable, may want to minimize such false 
positives as intervention may be both costly and inefficient. In this case, it is the ratio 
that one wants to minimize or that one wants to maximize.  
3. It is also feasible that one would want to minimize the occurrence of false negatives (type 
II errors). Policy makers who are interested in avoiding crises regardless of the cost and 
inefficiency of intervention would be particularly interested in this objective. Here, one 
seeks to minimize  or maximize .  
4. There is a trade off between type I and type II errors and one may be interested in 
balancing this trade off. For example, Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997) set the 
threshold at a level that minimized the noise to signal ratio, . This is equivalent to 
writing . If this ratio is less than one the indicator is classified as a useful 
predictor.  
The time horizon of the signals has to be chosen; signals that forecast a crisis over a short time 
horizon may be accurate but may not provide enough time for intervention. A longer time 
horizon may lose accuracy. Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997) choose a time horizon of 24 
months.  
The advantages of the signaling approach stem from the fact that indicators can be individually 
examined allowing one to identify which the more important ones are. Also, the number of 
indicators exhibiting erratic behavior gives an indication of the scope of the problems.  
There are two disadvantages to the signaling approach: it cannot be statistically tested or easily 
compared to the other approaches and marginal contributions are not assessed, meaning that if 
variables hold some common information that causes them to move in the same direction and 
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emit signals together, they will all be included as separate variables with the same weights 
(Abiad, 1999).   
The signals approach does not make use of a model but rather monitors the signals produced and 
the amount of indicators producing good signals (Abiad, 1999). Kaminsky, Lizondo and 
Reinhart (1997) find that the signals approach works well; on average, the range of indicators 
correctly forecast 70% of the crisis periods. 
The literature on the signals approach has expanded since Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart’s 
work; especially since their approach ignores the fact that some indicators may be more accurate 
than others. Kaminsky (1998a) uses a weighted average of the signals to create a composite 
indicator where the accuracy of each indicator is reflected in the weights. Berg and Patillo (1999) 
suggest using the indicators as explanatory variables in a logit/probit model. Kaminsky (1998a 
and 1998b) and Goldstein (1998) tested the forecasting performance of the signaling approach 
and found that it would have been a decent EWS mechanism for the Asian crisis.  
Edison (2000) further developed the signals approach to create a EWS for currency crises. 
Edison modifies the work of Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart by adding 8 countries to their 
original 20 as well as using 7 additional indicators. Edison (2000) found that the additional 
variables were important additions to the EWS in Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart’s (1997) 
paper, while the addition of the countries was not. The EWS that Edison (2000) created indicated 
vulnerability in the Asian countries a few months before the start of the crisis. Overall, the results 
are mixed- some indicator variables gave off early warning signals but many false alarms were 
generated.  
4.2.5 Comparing the Different Approaches 
Berg and Patillo (1999) used EWS models that were formulated before 1997 to investigate 
whether they would have been able to predict the Asian crisis had they been in use prior to the 
crisis. They found that the signals approach would have been more insightful than a random 
guess but does not predict the timing of a crisis very well. It was, however, a satisfactory 
approach for ranking countries according to the magnitude of a crisis. The authors find that the 
probit model of Frankel and Rose (1996) does not provide a satisfactory prediction of the Asian 
crisis. Berg and Patillo (1999) apply the cross sectional approach pioneered by Sachs, Tornell 
and Velasco (1996) to the Asian crisis and find the forecasting performance poor. 
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Berg, Borenztein and Patillo (2004) compare the predictions of Kaminsky, Lizondo and 
Reinhart’s signals approach to model independent indicators, for example bond spreads. Such 
non-model based indicators have been used by policy makers since the Mexican Peso Crisis 
which began in 1994. They found that the signals approach outperforms the independent 
indicators. The authors then look at four different models to see which are useful predictors of 
impending crises. The models are KLR (Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart’s 1997 model), DCSD 
(the Developing Country Studies Division model), CSFB (the Credit Suisse First Boston model) 
and GS (the Goldman Sachs model). The KLR model performs well both in- and out-of-sample. 
The DCSD model is informative but performs better in-sample that out-of-sample. The other two 
models perform well in-sample but poorly out-of-sample.   
4.2.6 An Alternative Approach: The Markov-Switching Approach 
Abiad (1999) used a Markov-switching model with time varying probabilities on data from 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand during 1974-1998. The model’s predictive 
performance was analyzed both in- and out-of–sample with the out-of-sample period starting in 
mid 1997. The model’s full-sample performance was satisfactory; signals were sent out for 
Thailand and Malaysia. The model was less informative for Indonesia and the Philippines. Out-
of-sample, the model performs well in the case of Thailand and poorly in the case of Malaysia. 
No out-of-sample testing was done for Indonesia and the Philippines due to the dissatisfactory 
full-sample results for these countries. The results fit well with the work of Radelet and Sachs 
(1998) that suggests that the crisis in Thailand began due to first generations effects while the 
underlying cause of the crisis in Indonesian and the Philippines is related to contagion.   
Fedderke (2011) outlines the steps behind creating early warning systems for the 15 SADC 
countries. In this paper, the steps to creating an early warning system are generalized so that they 
can be applied to any context. That is, one can create an EWS for any type of crisis.  
 
5.  The OLS approach, the Logit/probit approach, the Markov-switching approach 
and the data. 
One approach that is very popular in the literature on Early Warning Systems is the logit/probit 
approach. The Markov-switching approach exists as an alternative to this approach. The 
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mechanics behind these two approaches will be discussed in this section. This section will also 
introduce a third approach whereby EWS models are created using ordinary least squares (OLS).  
5.1 Defining a Crisis Period 
This paper will use the following general set up, as suggested by Fedderke (2011), to measure 
market pressure. This specification is chosen as it is simple and does not require any ad hoc 
special weights to any variables.  
       (5.1.1)
14
 
       (5.1.2) 
For the debt crisis case, the market pressure variable used will be referred to as DPVt. Xk is the 
kth constituent variable of the models pressure indicator and var(Xk) is its variance. wxk is the 
weighting assigned to the kth explanatory variable. In this case the explanatory variables are 
domestic private sector debt as a proportion of GDP (DPrYt), foreign private sector debt as a 
proportion of GDP (FPrYt), domestic public sector debt as a proportion of GDP (DPuYt), 
foreign public sector debt as a proportion of GDP (FPuYt) , foreign reserves (RESt) and the real 
exchange rate (RERt) (Fedderke, 2011). Thus the market pressure equation would be: 
 (5.1.3) 
where 
,   (5.1.4) 
Using the market pressure variable for a debt crisis (DPV), debt crisis periods can now be 
determined. This is done by setting a boundary and looking at where the DPV pierces this 
boundary. This boundary is arbitrarily set. Some studies have set the boundary as the mean plus 
1.5 standard deviations (For example, Eichengreen et al, 1995), Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart 
                                                          
14
 All equations found in this subsection are from Fedderke (2011) 
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(1997) set the boundary as the mean plus 3 standard deviations. Although all the studies agree 
that the boundary is arbitrarily set, it is commonly set as the mean plus two standard deviations 
in the literature. In this paper, I will set the boundary as the mean of the DPV variable plus 1.75 
of its standard deviations. Thus, the upper boundary is equal to 112.12 while the lower boundary 
is equal to -101.41. Adding 1.75 standard deviations to the mean allows me to pick up two 
additional crises that would not have been indicated by using a more conventional boundary. 
That is, crisis periods, CCt, are defined as follows
15
: 
        (5.1.5) 
The debt pressure variable piercing the upper boundary indicates that debt levels as a share of 
GDP have risen substantially. Such high levels of debt may not be sustainable and this is 
reflected through increases in the debt pressure variable. The DPV piercing the lower boundary 
indicates that debt levels as a share of GDP have fallen. This has a contractionary effect on the 
economy. The 2007 subprime collapse is an example of the case where debt levels increased 
substantially, but not sustainably; an upper boundary piercing by the DPV. The withdrawal of 
loan capital by foreign banks led to South Africa’s major debt crisis in the late 1980s; which was 
followed by a major recession in the early 1990s. This situation is an example of how decreases 
in the DPV can have contractionary effects. Given these two examples, it is clear that one should 
be concerned about piercing both the upper boundary as well as the lower boundary. 
                                                          
15
 Exclusion windows are used by researchers who are specifically interested in the onset of a crisis. That is, an 
exclusion window refers to a situation where the researcher ignores crises that take place within j-periods of each 
other (Abaid, 1999). A three year exclusion window was used by Frankel and Rose (1996) while Eichengreen et al 
(1995) used a one quarter exclusion window. Mathematically, an exclusion window is a modification to the 
definition of the crisis variable CCt. For example, for the debt crisis variable mentioned above in equation 5.1.5: 
  
Abaid (1999) points out a problem with an exclusion window. Independence across observations is assumed in a 
logit/probit model but the addition of an exclusion window implies that  when 
 
Exclusion windows will not be used in this study for this reason.  
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 The equations used to define crisis periods may not identify all crisis cases.  The debt pressure 
variable may rise without piercing the boundary and judgment may be required to decide 
whether or not it constitutes a crisis. For example, during the currency crisis in Sri Lanka in 
2000, no month was particularly distressing. Thus, EWS models analyzing the period registered 
it as a close call but not a crisis (See Berg, Borenztein and Patillo, 2004).   
5.2 The Data and Calculation of Debt Pressure Variable, DPV, and the binary CC variable 
Data from the South African Reserve Bank, SARB
16
, was used for this paper. The debt pressure 
variable (DPV) was calculated at a quarterly frequency from 1985-Q2 until 2010 –Q4. This was 
done because the constituent variables used to calculate the DPV were available in monthly 
frequency, except for one variable which was available in yearly frequency. Averaging monthly 
variables to quarterly data and interpolating yearly data to quarterly data results in a smaller error 
than that if annual data was interpolated to monthly data. Also, the majority of the indicator 
variables used to forecast debt crises (see table 5.3.1) are only available as quarterly data. The 
variables used to calculate the debt pressure variable, DPV are as follows: 
Variable Description SARB code Transformation 
Public Sector 
Domestic Debt 
Total loan debt of 
national 
government: Total 
domestic debt, 
measured in R 
millions. 
4105M 
 
This variable 
was averaged 
into quarterly 
data. 
Public Sector 
Foreign Debt 
Total loan debt of 
national 
government: Total 
foreign debt 
4108M 
 
This variable 
was averaged 
into quarterly 
data 
Private Sector 
Domestic Debt 
All monetary 
institutions : 
Credit extended to 
1369M Averaged into 
quarterly data 
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 South African Reserve Bank data can be found on their website: www.resbank.co.za 
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the domestic 
private sector: 
Total loans and 
advances 
Private Sector 
Foreign Debt 
Foreign debt of 
S.A.: Private 
sector 
5529J This variable 
was 
interpolated 
into quarterly 
data 
GDP Gross domestic 
product at market 
prices (GDP) 
current prices 
6006K  
RER The Real Effective 
Exchange Rate 
5378M This variable 
was averaged 
into quarterly 
data 
RES Foreign Exchange 
Reserves, 
measured in R 
millions 
5284M This variable 
was averaged 
into quarterly 
data 
Note: M indicates monthly data while K and J indicate quarterly and annual data respectively. 
Table 5.2.1: Variables used, in equation 4.10, for defining debt crisis periods.
17
  
Looking at table 5.2.1 it is clear that some information may be lost during the averaging 
procedure.
18
 Averaging can ―smooth out‖ data and thus eliminate potential crises. At the same 
                                                          
 
 
18
 The averaging procedure involves calculating the average over three months of a variable and using that average 
as a quarterly observation in the quarterly data set that one is aiming to create.  
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time, ―a month does not a crisis make‖ (Abiad, 1999, pp 18). That is, if a crisis is only indicated 
for a single month, it may not necessarily reflect a substantial structural problem. The aim of this 
paper is to look at the approaches to creating an early warning system for a debt crisis- a 
substantial structural problem rather than a temporary misalignment. Therefore, although 
averaging monthly data into quarterly data is not ideal- it is less of an issue for the context of this 
paper.  
Interpolation of the private sector foreign debt variable also may result in a loss of accuracy.
19
 
Quarterly data on private sector foreign debt was only available from 2002 while the annual data 
was available for the entire period of this study. A description of the annual data can be found in 
Table 5.2.1. The quarterly data used as a proxy for this variable can be found by summing the 
―Banking Sector‖ and ―Other Sectors‖ columns of the quarterly external debt data from SARB 
and then multiplying each observation by the exchange rate for that period in order to convert the 
Dollar denominated data into Rands. The annual data for private sector foreign debt was 
interpolated into quarterly data and used to calculate the market pressure variable. Substituting 
the interpolated data with the quarterly data and looking at the debt pressure variable from 2002 
onwards yielded a similar DPV graph. Thus, interpolation has not distorted the private sector 
foreign debt variable and the annual data will be used rather than the quarterly data as it is 
available for a longer time period. However, in the case where the quarterly private sector 
external data was used, the debt pressure variable (DPV1) pierced the lower boundary in 2006-
Q3 where the boundary is calculated as the mean plus 2 standard deviations (see graph 5.2.1). 
The debt pressure variable calculated from annual interpolated data does not indicate a crisis in 
2006-Q3. By calculating the boundary of the debt pressure variable (DPV) as the mean plus 1.75 
standard deviations, the 2006-Q3 crisis is picked up. In this study, I will calculate the debt 
pressure variable using the annual data for private sector foreign debt since it is available for a 
longer time period and thus allows me to try to forecast the biggest debt crisis in South Africa- 
the foreign debt crisis of 1985. I will however, set my boundary at 1.75 standard deviations 
added to the mean in order to pick up the 2006-Q3 crisis. 
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 Linear interpolation is used in this paper to transform annual data into quarterly data: the difference between each 
year is calculated and divided by four. Quarterly observations are created by adding a fourth of this difference to the 
starting year, and then adding a fourth of the annual difference to that, and so on.  
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Graph 5.2.1: DPV1 is the debt pressure variable calculated from the quarterly external debt data 
from SARB. DPV is the debt pressure variable where the annual data on private sector foreign 
debt (see table 5.2.1) is used.  
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The DPV variable as well as the boundary levels that will be used in this study are graphed 
below:  
 
Graph 5.2.2: The debt pressure variable (DPV) calculated as per equation 5.1.3 and 5.1.4. 
Included in the graphs are the boundaries, calculated as the mean plus 1.75 standard deviations 
of the DPV variable.  
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Graph 5.2.3: The CC variable, calculated as per equation 5.1.5, indicates the crisis periods. 
Spikes in the CC variable correspond to the points where the DPV variable pieces the boundary, 
indicating a crisis period.  
Berg, Borenztein and Patillo (2004) point out that crisis dates are pin pointed in EWS models 
even though the occurrence of such crises are not perfectly identified. Thus, ―the specification of 
EWS models involves a number of decisions that, while guided in some way by economic 
theory, are largely empirical and judgmental in nature‖ (Berg, Borenztein and Patillo, 2004, 
pp4). The crisis dates arrived at from equation 5.1.5 are discussed in the table below: 
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Crisis Periods Corresponding Economic Events in South Africa 
1985-Q3 Until 
1986-Q2 
In the late 1970s, loans were easily attainable and thus extensive borrow 
by the private and public sector took place. Foreign investments 
decreased in the early 1980s. The South African government assisted 
with loan capital whenever credit extensions were refused by foreign 
banks. The government financed such loans through gold swaps or by 
using funds borrowed from the IMF. Sanctions on the South African 
economy were placed in the 1980s and early 1990s. Such sanctions 
included the ban on IMF loans in 1983, a 1985 prohibition of many 
foreign bank loans, the United States 1986 Comprehensive Apartheid 
Act and the 1986 EEC (European Economic Community) prohibition on 
investments and trade.  In 1985 a major foreign debt crisis took place. 
This was mainly because short term loans were immediately withdrawn 
in 1985 by a group of foreign banks. A debt rescheduling contract was 
drawn up; it stipulated that a debt freeze would continue until June 1987 
at least (Byrnes, 1996).   
1991-Q1 and 1992-
Q2 
Although in 1991 the United States and the EEC had withdrawn their 
sanctions, foreign investors viewed SA as unstable, with high labor 
costs. High levels of consumer indebtedness as well as fears of violence 
and job losses were major restrictions on private consumption. There 
was a decrease in GDP in 1991 and 1992. 
The Major Debt Crisis in the late 1980s had forced South Africa to have 
current account surpluses for repayment purposes. In 1991 there was a 
drastic increase in the surplus. A major recession occurred from March 
1989 to May 1993 (Byrnes, 1996).  
In 1991-Q1 the real exchange rate increased, there was also an increase 
in the level of foreign reserves. Although private sector foreign debt as a 
share of GDP had be declining since 1985, it did show a slight increase 
in 1991-Q1. Both private and public sector domestic debt as a share of 
25 
 
GDP showed increases for the beginning of 1991.  
In 1992-Q1 the level of foreign reserves was higher. Debt as a share of 
GDP (both external and domestic for both the public and private sector) 
increased in 1992-Q1. 
2006-Q3 Turbulence hit the financial markets in May 2006. In June 2006 interest 
rates increased by 200 basis points. By mid 2006 the international price 
of crude oil was high, the rand exchange rate had weakened and food 
prices had risen. In fact, there was a currency crisis in June 2006 (see 
Knedlik and Scheufele (2007)). This put pressure on inflation (Fourie, 
2006). Public sector debt decreased in relation to GDP. Private sector 
debt as a share of GDP, which had been rising since the end of 2004, 
declined in 2006-Q3 before rising again. 
Table 5.2.2: Description of the crisis periods 
5.3 Data used for the Indicator Variables  
After defining the crisis periods, the next part of creating an EWS involves finding a model that 
forecasts these crisis periods. These models are discussed in section 6. The indicator variables 
used in these models are tabulated below (in table 5.3.1). Many of these indicator variables are 
chosen from a list of variables suggested by Fedderke (2011) as being potentially important for 
explaining a crisis. This list is comprised of variables that studies on debt crises, such as Lestano, 
Jacobs and Kuper (2003), have used as indicator variables. For example, Leoni and Lamarbre 
(1996) and Marchesi (2003) found that the probability of a debt crisis occurring increases with a 
low rate of growth of per capita GDP and high levels of capital inflows. Lestano, Jacobs and 
Kuper (2003) found the growth of money (M1 and M2) and the growth of per capita GDP to be 
significant indicators. The indicators that were found to be statistically significant in Ciarlone 
and Trebeschi (2006) include macroeconomic indicators, such as the growth rate of real GDP, as 
well as measures of both external debt and how it is financed. Fedderke’s (2011) list can be 
found in the appendix to this paper (see table A1). Table 5.3.2 briefly outlines why the chosen 
indicator variables may be important in explaining a debt crisis. The expected sign of each 
variable are also included in table 5.3.2.  
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Unless otherwise indicated, the indicator variables used in this study can be found on South 
African Reserve Bank’s (SARB) website20. They are listed in the table below.   
Variable Description and 
Frequency 
Transformation Name used 
in equations 
Source and code 
Current 
account/GDP 
Ratio of current 
account balance to 
gross domestic 
product. 
(Percentage). 
Quarterly 
 
 CA/GDP SARB 
KBP5380K 
Investment/ 
GDP 
Gross fixed capital 
formation 
(Investment). 
Quarterly 
Investment was 
divided by GDP 
and then first 
differenced in 
order to make it 
stationary 
INV/GDP SARB 
Investment: 
KBP6009K 
GDP: 6006K 
GDP/capita GDP divided by 
Population size.  
Quarterly 
 
GDP was divided 
by the population 
size and then first 
differenced in 
order to make it 
stationary 
GDP/cap GDP: SARB 
KBP6006 
Population Size: 
IFS 
19999Z ZF 
Growth in 
reserves 
Foreign Exchange 
Reserves. 
The percentage 
change in Foreign 
% Chg RES SARB 
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 See www.resbank.co.za 
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Monthly- averaged to 
quarterly 
Reserves was used KBP5284M 
Savings/GDP Ratio of gross 
savings to GDP. 
Quarterly 
This variable was 
first differenced in 
order to make it 
stationary 
Chg 
Sav/GDP 
SARB KBP6286 
M2 Monetary aggregates, 
money supply. 
Monthly 
This variable was 
first differenced in 
order to make it 
stationary 
Chg M2 SARB 
KBP1373 
Terms of 
Trade 
Foreign Trade: 
Terms of Trade: 
Excluding gold. 
Quarterly  
This variable was 
first differenced in 
order to make it 
stationary 
Chg TOT SARB 
KBP5036L 
Real GDP GDP at constant 
2005 prices 
Quarterly 
This variable was 
first differenced in 
order to make it 
stationary 
Chg GDPcon SARB 
KBP 6006C 
Gold Price The historic price of 
gold in Rands. 
Average for the 
quarter.  
The dollar value 
was multiplied by 
the Rand/Dollar 
exchange rate (see 
below). 
The natural 
logarithm of this 
variable was taken, 
then the first 
Chg Ln Gold Bundesbank
21
 
WP183HC 
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 See http://www.bundesbank.de 
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difference was 
calculated in order 
to make it 
stationary.  
Oil Price The price of Crude 
oil in Rands.(per 
barrel). 
Average for the 
quarter. 
 
The dollar value 
was multiplied by 
the Rand/Dollar 
exchange rate (see 
below). 
The natural 
logarithm of this 
variable was taken, 
then the first 
difference was 
calculated in order 
to make it 
stationary. 
Chg Ln Oil Dow Jones and 
Company
22
 
OILPRICE 
The Spread  The South African 
interest rate (Rsa): 
Yield on loan stock 
traded on the stock 
exchange: 
Government bonds - 
0 to 3 years 
(percentage) 
The U.S. interest rate 
(Rus): Market yield 
on U.S. Treasury 
South African 
interest rate (Rsa) 
minus the interest 
rate in the 
U.S.(Rus) 
Rsa-Rus  
This variable was 
first differenced in 
order to make it 
stationary 
Chg Rsa-Rus Rsa: SARB 
KPB2000 
Rus: The Federal 
Reserve Bank
23
 
H15/H15/RIFLGF
CM03_N.M 
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 See www.dowjones.com 
23
 See www.federalreserve.gov 
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securities at 3-month   
constant maturity, 
quoted on investment 
basis (percentage).  
Monthly-averaged 
into quarterly. 
The Rand 
Dollar 
Exchange 
rate 
The Rand Dollar 
exchange rate was 
used to convert the 
gold and oil prices 
into Rands. 
Averaged into 
quarterly data.  
  Federal Reserve 
Bank of St Louis 
FRED.EXSPUS 
Table5.3.1 Indicator Variables used for the logit approach and OLS approach.   
The reasons why the explanatory variables listed in table 5.3.1 were chosen as debt crisis 
indicator variables are highlighted below. The expected sign of each variable is included in the 
third column of table 5.3.2: 
Indicator Variable Why it was chosen as an indicator variable Expected sign 
GDP/Capita Rescheduling of debt is less likely in countries with higher 
income due to the high costs of rescheduling in higher 
income countries. The possibility of banking and debt 
crises is expected to be higher when domestic economic 
activity is curtailed (Dermirguc-Kunt and Detraigiache, 
1998). 
(-) 
Current 
account/GDP 
The expected result of a rise in this ratio is large capital 
inflows which the domestic financial system intermediates. 
This could promote credit and asset price booms (Berg and 
Patillo, 1999; Lestano, Jacobs and Kuper, 2003). The 
expectation of an increase in a current account surplus 
(-) 
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would be a lower chance to devalue which implies a lower 
chance of a crisis (Lestano, Jacobs and Kuper, 2003). 
Growth in 
reserves 
The total value of foreign reserves is oft used as an 
indicator of the financial difficulty a country has in dealing 
with debt repayment (Lestano, Jacobs and Kuper, 2003). 
(-) 
Investment/GDP Investment and debt are associated. Often, investments are 
funded through borrowed funds. Dividing investment by 
GDP gives the level of investment as a share of GDP. 
(+) 
Savings/GDP The probability of debt rescheduling may be expected to 
be lower when the levels of national saving are higher 
(Lanoie and Lemarbre, 1996) 
(-) 
M2 This is an indicator often associated with financial 
liberalization while draconian abatements in reserve 
requirements explain vast increases in the money 
multiplier (Kaminsky et al, 1997; Berg and Patillo, 1999; 
Edison, 2003; Lestano, Jacobs and Kuper, 2003) 
(+) 
Terms of trade The balance of payments position should improve with an 
increase in terms of trade, thereby lowering the probability 
of a crisis (Kaminsky et al, 1997; Berg and Patillo, 1999). 
(-) 
Real GDP The probability of a crisis occurring is increased when 
domestic economic activity deteriorates. 
(-) 
The Spread Relatively high South African interest rates will decrease 
domestic borrowing. 
(-) 
Gold Price The price of gold tends to increase sharply in times of 
economic uncertainty, as investors view gold as a safe 
haven investment. Thus sharp increases in the price of gold 
are often associated with crises, a phenomenon observed 
during the recent debt crisis in Europe. 
(+) 
Oil Price Higher oil prices and recessions tend to be associated. (+) 
Table 5.3.2 Importance of Debt Crisis Indicators 
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5.4 The OLS approach 
Before proceeding with the Logit and Markov-switching approach, I begin with a simple 
approach- using OLS to forecast changes in the debt pressure variable, DPV. The OLS approach 
is the logit approach in a time series context. That is, lagged values of the indicator variables will 
be used to try and forecast the occurrence of a crisis, but instead of using a binary dependent 
variable, the continuous DPV variable is used.  
The reason that I introduce the OLS approach to forecasting in this paper is because it may be 
useful to forecast the movements of the debt pressure variable itself. Abiad (1999) points out that 
the binary transformation used to create the CCt variable (see equation 5.1.5) results in a loss of 
information- one only knows whether or not the DPV variable has pierced the boundary or not; 
one does not know the movements of the DPV variable above or below the boundary. For this 
reason, it may be useful to create a model that forecasts movements in the DPV variable itself.  
The explanatory variables used in this approach can be found in table 5.3.1. The dependent 
variable is the DPV variable. 
5.5 The Logit/Probit Approach  
This early warning system model provides the probability of the onset of a crisis, k-periods 
ahead, conditional on a given set of indicators
24
. Seminal contributions to the logit/probit 
approach were made by Frankel and Rose (1996). In this approach, the indicators chosen are 
those which theory suggests might explain a crisis. Lagged values of these indicator variables are 
used as explanatory variables in order to predict crisis periods. This approach is useful for seeing 
the extent to which the indicator variables affect crisis probabilities. The dependant variable is 
the probability of a crisis. This approach requires predetermined crisis periods. A crisis period is 
defined as a period in which the crisis pressure variable exceeds some threshold. In order to 
determine whether the pressure for a crisis may be building, it is necessary to measure market 
pressure. 
One is interested in forecasting the probability of a crisis. Thus, leads are introduced. To 
introduce such leads, a new variable Yt is defined as follows: 
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 The logit/probit model will be explained in greater detail in the methodology section. 
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 (5.5.1)
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Here, d is the time period over which the crisis is to be forecasted. Obviously, there is a trade off 
involved with the choice of d. If d is low, one is only able to get forecasts a period or two in 
advance, which may not provide adequate time for policy makers to react. A forecast too far in 
advance, on the other hand, may come at the expense of accuracy (Fedderke, 2011) 
The explanatory variables used for forecasting can be found in table 5.3.1. There are three main 
advantages of the logit/probit approach. Firstly it produces a simple and easily understood result, 
the probability of the onset of a crisis, from all the information used. Secondly, a lotgit/probit 
model can be run on statistical software packages, without any difficulty and the statistical 
significance of each variable can be evaluated. Finally, the marginal input of each right hand side 
variable is taken into account, while looking at all the indicators together.  
According to Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997) the disadvantages of the logit/ probit 
approach are: indicators cannot be compared in terms of forecasting performance. Secondly, an 
indicators marginal effect on the probability is not easily evaluated due to the binary nature of 
the model. Statistical software packages give the marginal effect of a change in a right hand side 
variable but these are calculated at the variables mean, making these marginal effects less 
appealing in the context of early warning system models where one is looking at situations where 
variables are not close to their mean (Abiad, 1999). The final disadvantage of the logit/probit 
approach is that a variable may be statistically significant but that does not mean that it is 
accurate in predicting crises, it is possible that it simply doesn’t send many false signals. Abiad 
(1999) points out that this disadvantage is not particular to the logit/ probit approach and that 
significance tells us that the variable is useful for prediction regardless.  
5.6 Markov-switching 
Abiad (1999) points out some weaknesses in the methodology of the signals and logit/probit 
approaches: First, before estimation can take place, crisis dates are required a priori. Second, the 
approaches require thresholds and these thresholds are arbitrary. Also, the use of binary variables 
results in a loss of information. Abiad (1999) also shuns the two approaches for lacking 
theoretical motivation. Abiad (1999) introduces a different approach – an approaches which uses 
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 Source: Fedderke (2011) 
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the Markov-switching technique with transition probabilities that vary with time. Abiad (1999) 
favours Markov-switching models as they are well suited to variables that exhibit dramatic 
changes. Markov-switching models explicitly recognize how the current regime may affect the 
future one. They are also more informative that other models- apart from predicting the timing of 
a crisis, they can also predict the length of a crisis and which factors might end one. A priori 
information of crisis periods is no longer required, eliminating the need to set arbitrary 
thresholds.   
In the Markov-switching approach, one assumes that there are distinct states; each with distinct 
behavioral conditions. For the purposes of applying such models to early warning systems, the 
two states are tranquil and crisis (Fedderke, 2011).  
These unobservable states are denoted by the latent variable st such that: 
                       (5.6.1)
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yt is the market pressure variable; it is observable. yt depends on st since the characteristics of yt 
change under the different states; that is, the mean and variance differ under each state. The two 
state Markov chain is  
                  (5.6.2) 
 Conditional on the state, the density of yt is    
          (5.6.3) 
 The transition probability matrix Pt, that describes the behaviour of the latent variable, is 
given in equation 5.6.4.  
(5.6.4) 
 The transitional probabilities follow the logistic distribution (see Fedderke, 2011).  
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 All equations in this subsection can be found in Fedderke (2011) 
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 The  are estimated using the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm by 
Diebold, Lee and Weinbach (1994) 
 To generalize the one-period forecast probabilities to n period forecast probabilities the 
following equation is used:  
      (5.6.5) 
 Where the probability of a crisis exceeds some threshold an alarm is signalled. In the 
literature the threshold is generally set at about 50% (see Schweickert and De Souza 
(2005)).  
 
Although the Markov-switching approach is not a straight forward as the other approaches to 
forecasting, it defines a crisis at the same time as it develops the crisis forecast probability 
(Fedderke, 2011).  
 
6.  The Early Warning System Models 
 
In this section, four early warning system models are presented. The predictive performance of 
each of these models will be tested both in- and out-of-sample in the context of the OLS 
approach, the Logit approach and the Markov-switching approach. The in-sample period is from 
1985-Q2 until 2006-Q1. In order for a crisis period to be indicated in the OLS models, the 
forecast of the DPV variable needs to rise above 112.13 or fall below -101.41 as these are the 
upper and lower boundary levels calculated in equation 5.1.5. 
The most important criterion for assessing a EWS model is accuracy of the forecast; statistical 
significance is less of a concern in the assessment of the models. Thus a models predictive 
performance will be primarily judged on its ability to pick up the 2006-Q3 crisis (the out-of-
sample crisis). In the case of the OLS regressions, the RMSE (Root Mean Squared Errors) will 
also be commented on throughout in order to assist in the comparison of the different models’ 
forecasts.
27
  Although it is the out-of-sample forecast that one is interested in, a model that 
performs well in-sample may still be somewhat insightful; the goodness of fit of each model will 
                                                          
27
 A lower RMSE indicates a better forecast. 
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also be looked at. The estimated signs of the coefficients as well as their statistical significance 
will occasionally be commented on.  
6.1 Model 1 
Frankel and Rose (1996) attempted to forecast the onset of a crisis, one year in advance and the 
first model presented in this section follows in their footsteps.  In model 1, the indicator variables 
in table 5.3.1 are lagged by four periods to try to forecast crisis periods, one year in advance. 
First, I present the in-sample OLS forecast. The dependent variable used for this approach is the 
continuous debt pressure variable, DPV. The in-sample results are reported below: 
  
The only significant variables, at the 5% level, are the constant, the change in investment as a 
share of GDP and the change in real GDP. GDP per capita is significant at the 10% level. All of 
these significant variables have the expected signs. The current account as a share of GDP and 
the change in savings as a share of GDP have the incorrect signs but these variables are not 
significant. This in-sample forecast is graphed below: 
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Graph 6.1.1: The actual and fitted values from the in-sample OLS regression of model 1.  
As can be seen from results and graph 6.1.1, model 1 does not perform very well in-sample. 
With an R
2
 of 0.312 it is clear that model 1 has a poor ―goodness of fit‖ rating. None of the in-
sample crisis periods are picked up.  
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The out-of sample forecast results are reported below: 
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The results of the out-of-sample forecast reported above show that model 1 does decrease around 
the time of the 2006-Q3 crisis but not by enough to pick up the crisis; the DPV would have to 
decrease below -101.41 to indicate a crisis. The out-of –sample results are graphed below: 
 
Graph 6.1.2: The out-of-sample forecast for model 1 in the OLS regression 
Both the written results and the graphical results indicate that model 1 has a poor out-of-sample 
performance since the 2006-Q3 crisis is not indicated. The forecast does, however, mimic the 
movements in the DPV to some degree. 
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Model 1 was tested in the context of a logit model. The indicator variables remain the same as 
those used in the OLS context. The dependent variable is now the binary crisis period variable, 
CC. The in-sample results are presented below:  
 
The significant variables in the logit context are the constant, GDP per capita and the change in 
real GDP. However, GDP per capita is incorrectly signed; the probability of a crisis should 
decrease with higher levels of GDP per capita. While the OLS regression yields fitted values 
corresponding to the DPV, the logit regression gives the probability that a crisis will occur. 
Crisis periods are referred to as ―state 1‖ in the logit results. The coefficients in the logit 
regression indicate how the probability of a crisis is affected by a change in the explanatory 
variables. For example a 1% increase in the growth rate of foreign reserves decreases the 
probability of a crisis by 0.31%.  
The estimated probabilities of a crisis (state 1) from model 1 are graphed against the binary CC 
variable below. That is, we are graphing the actual crisis dates (dates where thee CC variable is 
equal to 1) against the estimated crisis dates, predicted by the logit model. This graph gives an 
indication of how good the logit models in-sample predictive performance is. In the case of the 
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written results, the log-likelihood ratio is used to compare the in-sample forecasts of different 
logit models.
28
  
 
Graph 6.1.3 The in-sample forecast of model 1 in the logit approach 
Using a threshold probability level of 0.35 to indicate a crisis, crises are indicated for 1985-Q4 
and 1986-Q1 (corresponding to the major debt crisis that began in in1985-Q3) as well as 1992-
Q1. The 1991-Q1 crisis was missed. Also, one false positive is picked up in 2005-Q2. 
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 The model with the best in-sample performance is that with the highest log-likelihood ratio- that is, one is 
aiming to maximize this ratio if one is looking for a good in-sample fit.  
41 
 
The out-of-sample predictions of the logit model are tabulated below:  
 
Although the logit model does not indicate a crisis in 2006-Q3, it does indicate a crisis for the 
following two quarters; this may simply be an issue of timing.  
Thus, model 1 is more informative than random guessing. In fact, given that model 1 is designed 
to forecast a crisis one year in advance, this model would have been able to warn policy makers 
that the pressure for a crisis was coming, three quarters in advance. 
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 The out-of-sample forecast is graphed below:  
 
Graph 6.1.4 The out-of-sample logit forecast of model 1. 
6.2 Model 2 
Abiad (1999) points out that by lagging all the indicator variables by k periods (whereby k=4 in 
the case of model 1, for example) one is not taking the effects of the intervening periods into 
account; the behavior of indicator variables in the periods between t and t+k may also affect the 
probability of a crisis. Model 2 maps the relationship between the crisis periods indicator (DPV 
in the case of OLS and CC in the logit context) and the lagged indicator variables. Model 2 is 
less restrictive than model 1; in this model, the indicator variables may be lagged between 2 
periods and 8 periods ahead. I have not used 1 period ahead lags due to the tradeoff mentioned in 
section 5.5. Recall, a 1 quarter ahead forecast does not give policy makers much time to react. Of 
course, by only including later lags there is a loss of accuracy in the forecasts.  
To arrive at model 2, I began by including all the indicator variables with all the lags, except lag 
1. From here I eliminated all the variables that were not statistically significant explanatory 
variables. The dropped variables were then re-added to the model, one at a time, to see what their 
effect on the model was. The variables that made the in-sample forecast pick up the in-sample 
43 
 
crisis dates were kept in the model; those that were not useful in picking up crisis dates were 
dropped. 
In the OLS context, Model 2 is presented below: 
 
 
Model 2 performs well in-sample; an R
2
 of 0.745 is indicative of a ―good fit‖. Also, by looking 
at the graph below, all the in-sample crises periods are picked up (although, the 1985 crisis is 
picked up from 1985-Q4). Unfortunately, three additional crises are indicated: 1988-Q1, 1989-
Q4 and 1994-Q1. It is possible that these false positives are in fact crisis dates that were not 
indicated due to the construction of the boundaries. All three of these dates correspond to times 
where the debt pressure variable has spiked, but just misses piecing the upper boundary. That is, 
these false signals correspond to periods where the pressure for a crisis may be building, but does 
not rise high enough to indicate a crisis using the definition in equation 5.1.5. In fact, the late 
1980s was a period under which South Africa was in a debt standstill. Also, debt rescheduling 
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agreements took place in 1987 and 1989 (as well as 1985, of course). The explanatory variables 
used in model 2 may be picking up these events. 
 
Graph 6.2.1. The in-sample forecast of model 2 using OLS 
The out-of-sample forecast of model 2 is presented below: 
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Graph 6.2.2 The out-of-sample forecast of model 2 using OLS 
Out-of-sample, model 2 does not perform very well; it does not indicate the 2006-Q3 crisis at all 
and it indicates a crisis in 2007-Q4 (the upper boundary is 112.13 and the forecast for 2007-Q4 is 
116.832).  
If a crisis is predicted but does not occur it is termed a false alarm (or false positive). Model 2 
contains some false alarms both in- and out-of-sample. Such information may be important for 
the following reasons: Firstly, some situations may not be defined as crises but still require 
attention. Secondly, good fortunes or actions by policy makers may avert such crises. It is, in any 
case, better to be warned and nothing happens than to not be warned at all.  
However, the forecast of model 2 does follow the DPV quite well. In fact, it even has a lower 
RMSE than model 1. Therefore, although it misses the 2006-Q3 crisis, model 2 does provide 
some insight out-of-sample as it indicates the movements in the DPV; even though it does not 
indicate the magnitude of such changes in the DPV. In-sample model 2 performs quite well; it 
picks up all of the in-sample crises. Model 2 appears to be particularly sensitive to pressures that 
are brought about by unsustainably high levels of debt- i.e. crises where the DPV pierces the 
upper bound. This may explain the difficulty model 2 has in indicating the 2006-Q3 crisis which 
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is due to the contractionary effect of low levels of debt. Thus model 2, in the OLS context, may 
be a functional tool that policy makers can use for avoiding unsustainably high levels of debt. Of 
course, given the sensitivity of model 2 to such pressures, judgment will be required in order to 
have an idea of when to react to such pressures.    
Placing model 2 into the logit context (with CC as the dependent variable rather than DPV) 
yields the following results: 
 
Although the probability that a crisis occurs (state 1) perfectly coincides with the in-sample crisis 
dates (see graph below), none of the indicator variables are significant in the logit model. 
However, as already mentioned, one is concerned about the forecast of the EWS model rather 
than the fit of the model. All but four of the indicator variables are correctly signed. The four 
incorrectly signed indicator variables are: the current account as a share of GDP (lagged 2 
periods), GDP/capita (lagged 6 periods), the change in real GDP (lagged 8 periods) and the 
change in the terms of trade (lagged 6 periods).   
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Graph 6.2.3. The in -sample logit forecast of model 2 
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The out-of-sample results of model 2 are reported below:  
 
 
 
Graph 6.2.4 The out-of-sample logit forecast of model 2. 
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Out-of-sample, the logit model predicts a crisis in 2006-Q4; a quarter later than the 2006-Q3 
predetermined crisis date. Again, this may simply be a timing issue. Given that the earliest lag in 
model 2 is two periods, and that the actual crisis occurred one period earlier than what was 
predicted, policy makers would still have had a warning, one quarter ahead, that the pressure for 
a crisis is building.  Thus, model 2 is more informative than random guessing. 
As a modification, I added the some of the explanatory variables of model 1 to model 2. 
Specifically, the added variables were the change in the terms of trade (Chg Tot_4),  the change 
in M2 (ChgM2_4) and the ratio of the current account to GDP (CAGDP_4), all lagged four 
periods. The addition of these variables did not improve the OLS forecasts at all; the out-of-
sample forecast remains the same. The addition of these variables does improve the logit out-of-
sample forecast, however. Below, I present the out-of-sample logit results of this modified 
version of model 2.  
 
As can be seen by these results, the 2006-Q3 crisis is picked up. In fact, the model signals that 
the crisis begins a quarter early. Since this model contains lags that are no sooner than 2 periods 
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ahead, policy makers would have been warned three quarters ahead of the 2006-Q3 crisis that the 
pressure for a crisis was building.   
6.3 Model 3 
In creating a EWS model, indicator variables are chosen and their parameters are estimated in 
order to achieve fitted values that mirror the actual observations in a given sample. Thus, a good 
in-sample forecast may be somewhat useful. On the other hand, it is also possible that after many 
different EWS models have been tried, the model with the best in-sample fit may be arrived at by 
coincidence.  Also, over time the factors that affect the likelihood of a crisis occurring may 
change.  
A functional EWS model needs to perform well out-of-sample, after it has been created. That is, 
it needs to indicate crises in ―real time‖ (Berg, Borenztein and Patillo, 2004).   
Model 3 is a modification of model 2 whereby indicator variables are added that may improve 
the out-of sample performance of the model, in the OLS context. Model three is presented 
below:  
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Model 3’s out-of-sample performance is satisfactory. It picks up the 2006-Q3 crisis and indicates 
no other crises between 2006-Q1 and 2009-Q1. This can be seen in the graph below.  
 
Graph 6.3.1. The out-of-sample forecast of model 3 in the OLS context 
 
Model 3 performs better out-of-sample than model 1 and model 2. The results of model 3’sout-
of-sample forecast include a root mean squared error (RMSE) of 45.725 while model 1’s RMSE 
was 61.624 and model 2’s RMSE was 60.208.29 
                                                          
29
 Note, a lower RMSE indicates a better fit.  
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The in-sample performance of model 3 is less satisfactory than model 2. As can be seen by the 
graph below, only one of the six in-sample crises is picked up- 1986-Q2.  Adding the variable, 
GDPcon_5 (i.e. the change in real GDP, lag 5) improves the in-sample forecast but also 
drastically worsens the out-of –sample forecast. The results of model 3 with the addition of 
GDPcon_5 are inserted into the appendix.   
 
Graph 6.3.2 The in-sample forecast of model 3, in the OLS context. 
Model 3 was inserted into the logit context and the results are presented below. Again, the 
probability of a crisis occurring is equal to one during the predetermined crisis dates. However, 
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like model 2, none of the indicator variables are significant; but, as already mentioned, one is 
less concerned about significance and more concerned about forecast in the context of Early 
Warning Systems. The results of the logit model are tabulated below:   
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Graph 6.3.3 The in-sample logit forecast of model 3 
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Out-of-sample, the logit model does not forecast the 2006-Q3 model. Unlike model 2, no crises 
are forecasted for 2006: 
 
 
From the above models, I am able to get two models that forecast well out-of-sample in the logit 
context and one model that forecasts the 2006-Q3 crisis straight from the DPV variable. To be 
specific, these models are: model 1 logit, model 2 logit and model 3 OLS.  Rather than following 
the forecasts of all three models together, the models should be taken as informative tools for 
predicting crisis; interpreting the results of the forecasts of each model should be combined with 
judgment.  
6.4 Markov-switching Models 
In creating a Markov-switching model, I follow the procedure in Abiad (2003); which begins 
with a general to specific procedure to reduce the potential number of explanatory variables. This 
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is done by estimating bivariate models; that is, a separate model was run for each explanatory 
variable (the PCGive results for this regression can be found in the appendix to this paper).  
The ―hill-climbing‖ method, that maximum likelihood estimation requires, will converge 
sluggishly if the indicators have different magnitudes. Abiad suggests transforming each 
indicator to have zero mean and unit variance. Instead, this paper will transform the indicators 
into percentage changes, as suggested by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997) and Berg and 
Patillo (1999).    
Using the bivariate regression results, indicator variables are chosen. Abiad (2003) chose 
indicators that are correctly signed, while Kittelman et al (2006) chose indicators based on 
significance and log-likelihood ratios. Following Kittelman et al’s approach, the indicator 
variables used in this Markov-switching model are the ratio of the current account to GDP and 
the percentage change in Real GDP.
30
 These indicator variables are put into a multivariate 
regime switching model. The PCGive output for this model can be found in the appendix.  
The model’s forecasted probability is then converted into a binary alarm signal, This is done, as 
usual, by setting a threshold level whereby if the forecast probability exceeds this level, a crisis is 
signaled. Here, the threshold is set at 50%. The graphs relating to this model are presented 
below:   
                                                          
30
 This variable was constructed using the same data as the change in real GDP (GDPcon). See table 5.3.1   
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Graph 6.4.1: Graphs indicting the actual and fitted values of the Markov-switching model (first 
panel), the tranquil periods (second panel) and the periods where the predicted probability is 
greater than 50% - indicating a crisis (last panel). 
The Markov-switching model yields a one period ahead forecast. Thus, to make it comparable, 
with other EWS models that use longer forecasting horizons, the forecasting horizons must be 
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matched. Assuming that there is no improvement or worsening in the determinants of the crisis 
probability, this is done using a generalized version of equation 5.6.5:
31
     
Pr (crisis over next n periods) =    (6.4.1) 
Converting the one quarter ahead forecast to a four quarter ahead forecast yields the following 
predicted probabilities:  
 
Graph 6.4.2: Four quarter ahead forecast using Markov-switching with only two explanatory 
variables and the constant. 
                                                          
31
 Note: I have generalized equation 5.6.5 to fit any frequency of data, rather than focusing on monthly forecasts.  
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The 1986-Q1, 1991-Q1 and 1992-Q1 crises are picked up. Unfortunately, numerous false signals 
are also indicated. However, although these false positives correspond to periods where, due to 
the crisis definition used in this paper, are not classified as crises, they are periods in which the 
debt pressure variable DPV spikes up toward the boundaries. In fact, if the boundary used in 
defining crisis periods was calculated using 1.5 standard deviations added to the mean rather 
than 1.75 standard deviations added to the mean, numerous crisis dated would have been 
indicated between 1985 and 1995, after which no crises occurs until 2002 (see graph 5.2.1, 
second panel). These results somewhat mirror those of the four period ahead Markov-switching 
model.   
For comparative purposes, Abiad (2003) introduces a baseline model: a simple Markov-
switching model with constant transition probabilities; that is, a model with a constant and no 
explanatory variables. The results of this PCGive output of this model can be found in the 
appendix. The relevant graphs are presented below: 
 
Graph 6.4.3:  Markov-switching model, constant transition probabilities. 
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As can be seen from graph 6.4.3, the baseline model is only able to pick up the 1985-1986 crisis. 
However, the duration of the crisis according to this Markov-switching model is longer than the 
crisis definition of this paper suggests; the Markov-switching model indicates that the crisis 
begins in 1985-Q2 while the crisis definition used in this paper suggests that it starts in 1985-Q3. 
From the PCGive output of this baseline model, it is clear that state 0 is a low volatility regime 
while state 1 is a high volatility regime.   
Although this simple model does not pick up all the false positives that the multivariate model 
indicates, it also does not contain any explanatory variables, which defeats the purpose of an 
EWS model. Thus, I remind the reader that this simple baseline model is included for 
comparative purposes and is not considered as an EWS model.   
7. Graphical Analysis 
In light of the Event Study Analyses conducted by Frankel and Rose (1996) and Eichengreen et 
al (1995), a brief graphical analysis is provided in this section.  
A graphical analysis is used in the Early Warning System literature as it is a helpful method of 
analyzing the behavior of explanatory variables around crisis periods. It aids one in examining 
both the ―seeds‖ and the ―aftermath‖ of a crisis (Frankel and Rose, 1996, pp 359).  
The graphs of each indicator variable are plotted below. Included in each graph are vertical lines 
representing the predetermined crisis dates. The horizontal line found on each graph represents 
the mean value of the variable during tranquil periods. Tranquil averages are included in each 
graphic as they facilitate the comparison of behavior during tranquil periods with that around 
crisis periods.  
By looking at each graphic, one can see how the indicator variable behaves before, during and 
after a crisis. In this graphical analysis, all the crisis periods are included in each graphic. This 
allows one to look at the behavior of each indicator around all the crisis periods in order to see if 
there is any behavior, of an indicator, that is common to all the crises.  
Based on the graphs below, Table 7.1 tabulates the behavior of the indicator variables during the 
crisis periods.  
 
61 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
 
 
63 
 
 
 
64 
 
 
 
65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
Variable 1985-Q3 1985-Q4 1986Q1 1986-Q2 1991-Q1 1992-Q1 2006-Q3 
Change in 
Terms of Trade 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Growth of Gold 
Prices 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Growth in Oil 
Prices 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Change in Real 
GDP 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
GDP/Capita Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Growth of 
Foreign 
Reserves 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Approx. 
= 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Change in Below Below Below Below Above Above Below 
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Investment/GDP Tranquil 
Mean 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Ratio of the 
Current Account 
to GDP 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Change in the 
Spread (Rsa-
Rus) 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Approx. 
= 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Change in M2 Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Change in 
Savings as a 
Share of GDP 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Below 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Above 
Tranquil 
Mean 
Table 7.1: The behavior of indicator variables during crisis periods in relation to their tranquil 
averages. 
None of the variables shows the same behavior during all the crisis periods. That is, they may be 
higher than normal during one crisis and lower than their tranquil average during a different 
crisis. This makes it difficult to characterize the behavior of any of the chosen indicators during 
crisis periods. One can also use these graphics to look at behavior of variables before and after 
the crises take place. For example, the change in M2 falls below its tranquil mean before a crisis 
takes place. However, for the majority of the variables, it is difficult to characterize their pre- or 
post- crisis behavior as it is not consistent across all crisis periods. 
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However, a crisis that corresponds to an upper piercing of the boundary (an upper crisis) may 
stem from different factors than a crisis that corresponds to a lower boundary piercing (a lower 
crisis) and it is possible that indicator variables may behave differently under each of these 
scenarios. In fact, looking at table 7.1 it is clear that the change in real GDP, GDP/capita and the 
change in the spread exhibit different behavior during upper and lower crises; the change in real 
GDP and GDP/capita are below the tranquil mean during upper crises and above the tranquil 
mean during lower crises. The change in the spread is above the tranquil mean for upper crises 
and below the mean for lower crises.  
8. Conclusion and Recommendations for Further Research 
This paper reviewed the seminal literature on EWSs as well as discussed the relevant literature 
on debt crises. Following the literature review, the methodology behind creating EWS models 
was presented. Four EWS models are created to illustrate the methodology of creating Early 
Warning Systems. Three of the models are estimated using the OLS approach and the Logit 
approach. The fourth uses the Markov-switching approach outlined in Abiad (2003). A brief 
Graphical Analysis is also conducted. 
This paper arrives at three useful models- model 1 in the logit context, model 2 in the logit 
context and model 3 in the OLS context. This finding is in line with that of Berg and Patillo 
(1999) and Edison (2003); that is, the models results are better than random guessing but are 
somewhat mixed. Having three EWS models that require some judgment in interpreting the 
results is not uncommon; the Bank of England uses a suite of models to forecast the crisis 
periods. The Markov-switching model predicted too many false positives and further 
development of this model is required. This task is left for future research.    
Creating a functional EWS is no easy feat considering the variety of crises that can occur; this is 
especially true under circumstances of poor quality data. Given a finite set of indicator variables 
it is difficult to find models with a good predictive performance.  
My immediate recommendation for future research would be to try to find other indicator 
variables that may lead to models with better forecasting performance than the ones presented in 
this paper. Also, the construction of the debt pressure variable used in this paper includes 
measures of both external and domestic debt for both the private and public sector. However, it is 
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possible that different indicators may be more appropriate for public sector debt rather than 
private sector debt or visa-versa. Therefore, it may be interesting to construct two debt pressure 
variables, one for private sector debt and one for public sector debt and then forecast the crisis 
periods of each of these variables separately. This task is left for further researchers. 
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Appendix 
Indicator Variables used in other studies: 
Table A1: Variables used for Debt Crises. Source: Fedderke (2011) 
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Model 3 with the addition of GDPcon_5: 
 
 
In-sample performance: 
The in-sample performance, in the case where, GDPcon_5 has been added to the model, is better 
than that of model 3; two additional crises have been picked up- 1985-Q4 and 1986-Q1. There 
are however, 2 false positives- 1988-Q1 and 1994-Q1.  
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Including the addition variable (GDPcon_5) has drastically worsened the out-of-sample forecast. 
The RMSE rises from 45.752 to 56.264 when the extra variable is added, thus the out-of-sample 
forecast worsens. The graph below illustrates that the 2006-Q3 crisis is not indicated but a false 
alarm is present in 2007-Q4.  
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Markov-switching: 
Bivarite Models from Section 6.4.1 (These regressions were run over the full sample) 
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Multivariate Markov-Switching model, full sample: 
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Baseline Markov-switching model with constant transition probabilities: 
 
